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In his study on Britain and the Genocide Convention, Brian Simpson provided fascinating 
insights into the internal deliberations of British government departments on whether Britain 
should accede to the Genocide Convention and concluded that any general explanation for 
why States accede to international humanitarian treaties can be valuable only if based on 
empirical studies.1 As Carty notes, political events involve a powerful blend of counter-
positions and political spin, where State intentions are “state secrets except [when] the State 
itself chooses to disclose them, when recalcitrant officials leak them or journalists otherwise 
come… [upon them] (AOS)”.2 Consequently, given the rhetoric used by States in 
international and domestic fora, the hidden practices are challenging to deduce or construct as 
they are “largely secret and one obtains only sporadic glimpses of [them]”.3 Therefore, 
studies on contemporaneous State conduct are hampered by the very fact that the events are 
ongoing. However, when State archives reveal those hidden practices, they provide 
wonderfully rich empirical data on State conduct during critical historical moments. 
Inspired by Simpson’s investigation, this paper divulges an empirical study of the 
internal deliberations of Irish government departments on Ireland’s accession to the Genocide 
Convention. Its aim is to elicit why Ireland delayed accession to the Genocide Convention for 
over two decades, why the Irish Cabinet eventually decided to accede in 1968 and why there 
was a continuing delay until ratification in 1976. It demonstrates how each of the critical 
elements, identified in Simpson’s study, varies in significance in the Irish case study. Here, in 
contrast to their British counterparts, Irish government departments were more cohesive on 
issues of doctrinal law and their perception of the Convention’s function. Irish government 
departments were also more influenced by status-oriented concerns than domestic interest 
groups in contrast to the British engagement. Bureaucratic politics and political leadership 
invariably played out differently as there was no interdepartmental dispute over doctrinal law, 
as happened between the Foreign Office and Home Office. Ultimately, the Irish Cabinet 
decision to accede was brought about only after changed attitudes among certain officials in 
External Affairs combined with Ministerial leadership. Notwithstanding the Cabinet decision, 
further delay was precipitated by inertia from Justice and later the Attorney General’s Office 
in producing a final Genocide Bill. As Alvarez observes, theoretical models on State 
ratification can never fully capture “real world events” as ultimately State practice is “messy” 
and leaves observers with a “confusing muddle” of critical factors.4 
 
                                                          
1 A.W.B. Simpson, “Britain and the Genocide Convention” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 
5. The author is sincerely grateful to Dr Stephanie Berry and Dr Tarik Kochi from Sussex Law School and to an 
anonymous reviewer for their very helpful and insightful comments. She is also very grateful to Mr Gregory 
O’Connor, Archivist National Archives Dublin, Ms Kate O’Malley, Assistant Editor of Documents on Irish 
Foreign Policy and Stephanie Breen, Assistant Librarian, Early Printed Books, Trinity College Library for their 
research assistance on civil servant biographical information. 
2 A. Carty, “Distance and Contemporaneity in exploring the practice of states: the British Archives in relation to 
the 1957 Oman and Muscat Incident” (2005) 9 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 75 at 76. 
3 Carty, “Distance and Contemporaneity” (2005) 9 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 75 at 78. 
4 J.E. Alvarez, “Do States Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 968. 
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I.  CERTAIN HYPOTHESES ON WHY STATES ACCEDE TO THE GENOCIDE 
CONVENTION 
 
In his study, Simpson detailed the interdepartmental dispute on doctrinal law between the 
Attorney General and the Home Office in the late 1940s. This centred on whether strict or 
mere substantive compliance with domestic law was required in order to be able to accede. 
The major stumbling block was over the obligation to remove the political offences exception 
for acts of genocide under art.VII of the Genocide Convention. The 1870 British Extradition 
Act prevented extradition for political offences5 and the UK “had always insisted on its 
absolute right to grant asylum for … political offences”.6 While the English courts had 
authority to determine whether an offence was political in character, the Home Secretary 
retained a general discretion to refuse extradition subject to certain safeguards.7 Yet both the 
Home Office and the Attorney General agreed that an English court could rule that an act of 
genocide was a political offence “in the absence of domestic legislation” that removed the 
political offences exception.8 This conclusion obviously stemmed from the inconsistencies 
within the English courts’ jurisprudence on the legal test for determining whether an act is of 
political character.9 In fact, a 1968 Home Office memo described this jurisprudence as being 
“in a very unsatisfactory state”.10 Overall, Simpson argued that the interdepartmental dispute 
did not simply reflect disagreement over what constituted domestic law conformity with the 
Convention. Rather it appears to have been “more fundamentally a disagreement … as to 
what the function of the Convention really was”.11 From the competing views, the 
Convention was either merely “symbolic” or “primarily practical, to deter future acts of 
genocide”.12 Despite the intense interdepartmental dispute over extradition, this key 
stumbling block has never been raised before English courts.13 Along with issues of doctrinal 
law, other critical factors were revealed by Simpson’s study, such as domestic interest 
groups,14 political leadership (or lack thereof), bureaucratic politics and to some extent, 
status-oriented concerns.15 
Alvarez has read Simpson’s empirical study through the lens of three models of 
compliance mechanisms and this demonstrates how each model emphasises certain aspects of 
empirical data as being critical descriptors of State motivation and behaviour. Scholars 
adopting a coercive model of compliance (such as realist scholars) would conclude overall 
that Britain ratified only when it was in its material interest to do so.16 Scholars adopting a 
persuasion model would focus on the influence of key domestic interest groups and how 
                                                          
5 Extradition Act 1870. 
6 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 38. 
7 See s.11 of Extradition Act 1870. 
8 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 38.  
9 Two key cases adopted different definitions of “political offence” yet it remained unclear if the later judgment 
Re Meunier was controlling. See Re Castioni [1891] 1 QB 149 at 165–166 and Re Meunier [1894] 2 QB 415 at 
419.  
10 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 45 (“few in number, in conflict 
with each other and in some cases very vague”). 
11 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 64. 
12 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 64. 
13 See R v Evans and Bartle and the Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Augusto Pinochet 
[1998] EWHC 1013 (Admin) (albeit British arrest warrant was issued over charge of murder). 
14 See Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 43–44, 49–50, 52–53, 58, 60. 
15 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 48–49. 
16 Alvarez, “Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 962. See Oberdoerster, “Why Ratify?” (2008) 61 
Vanderbilt Law Review 681 at 686 (categorised as rationalism). 
3 
 
certain lawyers in the Home Office were conscious of those constituencies.17 Scholars 
focusing on “status-oriented concerns” would conclude that the Foreign Office was 
influenced by the potential for embarrassment if Britain was left among a smaller number of 
non-ratifying States that included apartheid South Africa.18 Nevertheless, Alvarez identifies 
how certain influential factors are not accounted for by these models, namely bureaucratic 
politics, personal leadership and doctrinal law. Bureaucratic politics highlighted how 
different government departments are “captured by certain interests, exhibit path-dependent 
behaviour, and prefer the status-quo”.19 Political leadership underlines how certain 
personalities and their ability to persuade others are significant. Similarly, changes in 
government can lead to behavioural changes within departments. Finally, issues of doctrinal 
law are particularly influential.20 In other words, none of these compliance models is able to 
fully capture “real world events” because state practice is “messy”—“observers are left with 
a confusing muddle in which everything matters, at least a little bit”.21  
That said, where appropriate this paper draws on certain concepts within the 
persuasion and status-oriented models, in particular norm cascade and geographical 
proximity. “Norm cascade” is the “tipping point” when a “critical mass of relevant state 
actors adopt the norm” and this norm influence means other State actors follow suit in order 
to enhance their reputation.22 Geographical proximity is where higher levels of ratification 
within a State’s wider geographical area increase the probability of ratification.23 The latter 
continues to have supporters but “norm cascade” has been challenged in regards to the 
Genocide Convention. Greenhill and Strausz concluded that only after 1987 did the rate of 
probability of ratification by non-ratifying States increase in keeping with a typical case of 
“norm cascade”.24 In their view, the Genocide Convention was a victim of its own success 
where internalisation of the norm decreased the impetus to ratify the treaty, especially in 
competition with more pressing human rights issues.25 However, the Irish case study 
demonstrates the complexity of interacting factors for each state, which may accord with 
certain theoretical probability rates yet discord with others. In the Irish case, Ireland’s 
“hidden practices” accord with Greenhill and Strausz’ conclusion on common law states, as 
having a reluctance to ratify due to doctrinal law concerns. Yet these practices discord with 
their conclusion on new democratic states, as having no probability of ratification despite the 
expectation of a general desire to ratify human rights treaties.26 Irish officials read the 
Genocide Convention as useful for Ireland’s general human rights treaty image and 
maintained an interest in acceding to the treaty when a norm cascade was evident. Overall, 
Alvarez’s concept of real world practice as “messiness” is more apt than a general 
explanation of behaviour.  
                                                          
17 Alvarez, “Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 965. See Oberdoerster, “Why Ratify?” (2008) 61 
Vanderbilt Law Review 681 at 692 (categorised as liberalism). 
18 Alvarez, “Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 964 (categorised as constructivism, emphasising 
normative ideals and how moral positions and social structures influence state behaviour, including a “norm 
cascade”).  
19 Alvarez, “Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 964.  
20 Alvarez, “Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 965. 
21 Alvarez, “Socialize?” (2004) 54 Duke Law Journal 961 at 968. Alvarez’s criticism would also apply to 
integrated theories of ratification (that combine elements of the three models). See O. Hathaway, “Why do 
Countries Commit to Human Rights Treaties?” (2007) 51(4) Journal of Conflict Resolution 588. 
22 M. Finnemore and K. Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change” (1998) 52 International 
Organization 887 at 895.  
23 Goodliffe and Hawkins, “Explaining Commitment” (2006) 68(2) Journal of Politics 358 at 364 (concurring 
with B. Simmons (2002)). 
24 Greenhill and Strausz, “Explaining Non-ratification” (2014) 10 Foreign Policy Analysis 371 at 372.  
25 Greenhill and Strausz, “Explaining Non-ratification” (2014) 10 Foreign Policy Analysis 371 at 374–375.  
26 Greenhill and Strausz, “Explaining Non-ratification” (2014) 10 Foreign Policy Analysis 371 at 384. 
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II. WHY IRELAND DELAYED IN ITS DECISION TO ACCEDE: THE 1950S TO THE 
LATE 1960S 
 
Ireland’s failed application for United Nations membership meant that Ireland was excluded 
from participating in the UN General Assembly debates during the drafting of the Genocide 
Convention in 1948.27 After World War II, Ireland’s internationalist image in the League of 
Nations was replaced by a loss of goodwill due to its wartime neutrality and De Valera’s 
signature of Hitler’s book of condolences.28 Ireland’s application remained effectively 
suspended until the United States and the Soviet Union managed to negotiate the entry of a 
number of their allies in 1955.29 Therefore, only in 1950 did External Affairs and Justice 
examine whether to accede to the Genocide Convention.30 This was prompted by two visits to 
the Washington Embassy that led the Irish ambassador John Hearne to seek guidance on what 
was Ireland’s position. In their respective visits, Raphael Lemkin31 and the Korean 
ambassador Mr Chang strongly urged Ireland to accede with utmost haste.32 In the latter case, 
the Korean War and the potential threat to the Christian population in the Communist-
controlled entity in particular signalled a “new international need for the Genocide 
Convention”.33 In his request, the Irish Ambassador enclosed the statistics on ratifications; 
while there were 43 signatories, only 12 States had ratified.  
External Affairs and Justice’s examination was premised on the assumption that strict 
compliance with domestic law was necessary. One External Affairs official, in his advice to 
the Legal Adviser to the Department of External Affairs, elaborated the British Government’s 
position in detail, indicating support for the British reservations. Iremonger recounted that 
Britain had abstained in UN Legal Committee34 and in the final vote in the plenary in the UN 
General Assembly Britain had voted in favour with the proviso that it could not be seen as 
committing “to action which would prejudice the long established and traditional right... to 
grant asylum to persons charged with political offences”.35 Worryingly, Irish officials relied 
exclusively on the rhetoric of British officials. They did not investigate any further with their 
British counterparts who were at the time engaged in an interdepartmental dispute over strict 
                                                          
27 On the drafting history, see W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes, 2nd edn 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).  
28 M. Kennedy and J.M. Skelly, “The Study of Irish Foreign Policy” in M. Kennedy and J.M. Skelly, Irish 
Foreign Policy (Dublin: Four Courts Press,  2000), p.23. 
29 D. McMahon, “Our mendicant vigil is over: Ireland and the United Nations, 1946–55” in M. Kennedy and D. 
McMahon (eds), Obligations and responsibilities: Ireland and the United Nations, 1955-2005: Essays Marking 
Fifty Years of Ireland's United Nations Membership (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration, 2005), pp.5–24.  
30 DFA 417/65 Part I (Minute from Irish Ambassador to the US John Hearne, 8 June 1950). However, an earlier 
request was sent to Ireland from UN Secretary General in December 1949 without any response from External 
Affairs. See UNGA Res 368(IV) (3 December 1949).   
31 Raphael Lemkin was a Polish lawyer who in 1944 coined the term “genocide” by combining the Greek genos 
(race) with the Latin cide (killing) in his famous work Axis Power in Occupied Europe. In Axis Power, he 
chronicled Nazi atrocities in the Nazi-occupied territories and his research was an influential source for the 
Allied Prosecutors at the Nuremberg Trials. In 1946, he energetically lobbied States within the newly 
established United Nations General Assembly to adopt a Resolution on the Crime of Genocide and later, the UN 
Genocide Convention. See J. Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the struggle for the Genocide Convention, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington Carnegie 
Endowment in International Peace 1944 and U.N.G.A. Res. 96(I) of 9 December 1946.   
32 DFA 417/65 Part I. Minute from John Hearne, 8 June 1950 and Letter from Korean ambassador Chang 31 
July 1950. 
33 DFA 417/65 Part I.  
34 DFA 417/65 II (Iremonger to the Legal Adviser Michael Rynne, 18 August 1950).  
35 DFA 417/65 II (Iremonger to the Legal Adviser). See generally Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British 
Yearbook of International Law 5 at 32–35 and 475 Hansard, Cols 1501–1502 (18 May 1950). 
5 
 
or mere compliance. However, it is also evident that status-oriented concerns were not as 
influential. This appears to be due to the fact that key States had not yet ratified. However, it 
may also have been affected by Ireland’s international focus at the time, which was directed 
towards its membership of the Council of Europe,36 its desire to be part of the Marshall Plan 
and its negotiation of certain treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights.37 
Therefore, Iremonger advised that the current statistics on the Convention’s ratifications 
indicated an overall “slowness” of States in ratifying the Genocide Convention. As the British 
reservations indicated, Iremonger suggested that States found it challenging to reconcile 
many of the Convention’s obligations with their domestic laws.38  
Given the evident difficulties for other common law States, Iremonger argued that 
Justice must be consulted.39 However, the tone of his letter to Justice did not suggest any 
urgency and did not highlight any desirability for Ireland to accede.40 In fact, the letter 
pointedly stressed the limited number of ratifications.41 Meanwhile, Raphael Lemkin had 
once again visited the Irish ambassador, who again sought Ireland’s position.42 By now, 
Justice had replied to Iremonger and External Affairs could finally devise its policy.43 Justice 
reported that the Minister for Justice was “strongly of the opinion that Ireland should not 
become a party to this Convention unless and until it is found that we are the only country not 
ratifying or acceding to it” (emphasis added).44 The attached opinion from Justice is missing 
but some indications of Justice’s reasons are among handwritten notes.45 The Secretary of the 
Department of Justice explained to External Affairs that the Minister for Justice concurred 
with the British objections.46 While not explicit in the notes, it would appear that the political 
offences exception was the key consideration as Irish government departments did not 
examine the issue of reservations in the same depth as their British counterparts.47 
When one appreciates the considerable uncertainty surrounding Irish extradition law at 
the time, it is understandable why there was such a cause for concern. In fact, it is arguable 
that the extradition law issues were a greater stumbling block for Irish officials than for their 
British counterparts. The key challenge was an uncertainty as to whether previous extradition 
arrangements, based on British extradition law, had survived the 1937 Constitution at all.48 If 
not, this would have required an overhaul of extradition arrangements in general. On 
extradition to Britain, the uncertainty was only resolved by judicial review in 1952. During 
the existence of the Irish Free State, the legal basis for extradition to Britain was governed by 
s.29 of the Petty Sessions (Ireland) Act 1851, whereby arrest warrants issued by English 
magistrates were “endorsed” and executed by Irish police officers.49 In 1952, the Supreme 
                                                          
36 See E. Keane, “Coming out of the Cave: The First Inter-Party Government, the Council of Europe and 
NATO” (2004) 15 Irish Studies in International Affairs 167. 
37 W.A. Schabas and A. O’Sullivan , “Politics and poor weather: How Ireland sued the UK under the ECHR” 
(2007) 2 Irish Yearbook of International Law 3–29. 
38 DFA 417/65 II (Iremonger to Legal Adviser). 
39 DFA 417/65 II (Iremonger to Legal Adviser). 
40 DFA 417/65 Part I (Nunan to Berry, Secretary of the Department of Justice, 23 August 1950).  
41 DFA 417/65 Part I (Nunan to Berry). 
42 DFA 417/65 II (Hearne to External Affairs, 13 October 1950). 
43 DFA 417/65 II (Iremonger to Hearne, 15 October 1950).   
44 DFA 417/65 II (Minute from Minister of Justice, 22 September  1950). 
45 DFA 417/65 Part II (Waldron to Legal Adviser Fay, 9 December 1952) (note of the conversation is missing).  
46 DFA 417/65 Part I.  
47 External Affairs only discussed whether to submit observations to the International Court of Justice, and here 
Iremonger assumed that External Affairs would not wish to submit a written statement given the attitude 
towards the Genocide Convention. See DFA 417/65 II. (Iremonger to O’Reilly, 22 February 1951). 
48 Art.50 of Bunreacht na hÉireann (“subject to this Constitution and to the extent to which they are not 
inconsistent therewith”). 
49 State (Dowling) v Brennan and Kingston [1937] I.R. 483. 
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Court ruled that s.29 survived the enactment of the 1937 Constitution and continued to have 
force of law.50 On extradition to former British dominions, it was ruled in State (Kennedy) v 
Little that s.3 of the Fugitive Offenders Act (1881) continued to have force in the Irish Free 
State.51 However, its consistency with the 1937 Constitution had not yet been judicially 
tested.52 On extradition to States other than Britain and its former colonies, this appeared to 
be governed by the British Extradition Act 1870. However, prior to the Extradition Act 1965, 
this was rarely requested and as a result the Irish courts had not determined whether the terms 
of the 1870 Act were consistent with the 1937 Constitution.53 On the critical issue of the 
political offences exception, the Supreme Court ruled in 1952 that this exception was not a 
“generally accepted principle of international law” according to Art.29(3) of the 1937 
Constitution.54 Rather, international law recognised a right of the State to apply the exception 
and this right was exercised under domestic law. In other words, the exception would have 
been incorporated in Irish law if the terms of the Extradition Act 1870 were consistent with 
the 1937 Constitution, an issue which remained uncertain. In turn, as this writer has noted, 
English jurisprudence over the definition of offences of a political character was “in an 
unsatisfactory state”. 
It follows, then, that William Butler in External Affairs advised that Ireland “should not 
be in too great hurry to accede”.55 He described the list of ratifications as not “impressive” 
because there were only 20 of the 60 United Nations Member States on the list and the “more 
important members of the United Nations” had not yet accepted it. 56 Therefore, for the time 
being, the Department of External Affairs should just keep the file up to date as new 
ratifications were deposited.57 In light of this, Iremonger suggested to the Irish ambassador 
that the best reply to any further enquiries was that the matter was receiving “careful 
consideration by the Government”.58 
 
(a) Status-oriented concerns, geographical proximity and the “symbolic” Convention 
 
While status-oriented concerns did not become a critical influence on behaviour in the 1950s, 
External Affairs were alert to the fact that such concerns might become a critical factor at a 
later point. Therefore, they maintained an account of ratifications as well as any 
reservations.59 External Affairs were particularly interested in how ratifying States were able 
to comply with the Convention’s obligations, with one official suggesting that the key States 
to keep an eye on were Australia, France and Norway.60 Historical ties and a shared common 
                                                          
50 State (Duggan) v Tapley [1952] I.R. 62. See State (Quinn) v Ryan [1965] I.R. 70 (s.29 deemed 
unconstitutional). 
51 [1931] I.R. 39. 
52 G. Hogan and G. Whyte, JM Kelly’s The Irish Constitution, (Dublin: Butterworths, 2003), p.1646. 
53 Hogan and Whyte, JM Kelly, pp.1646–47. 
54 State (Duggan) [1952] I.R. 62. 
55 DFA 417/65 Part II. (Butler to Iremonger, 12 December 1950). From 1948 to 1951, William Butler was the 
First Secretary and Counsellor in the Department of External Affairs Headquarters, Dublin (and later from 1954 
to 1957). He entered External Affairs as a Junior Executive Officer in March 1934, then as diplomatic Staff in 
Headquarters from 1941 and later served as Second Secretary in the Irish Legation, Berne (1944–1948), as 
Chargé d’Affaires in Canberra (1957) and was Irish Minister to Argentina. He was also a Knight Commander of 
the Order of St Gregory the Great. Thanks to Ms Kate O’Malley, Assistant Editor of the Documents on Irish 
Foreign Policy, for this information. See also Obituary Mr William B. Butler, Irish Times, 4 November 1961. 
56 DFA 417/65 Part II (Butler to Iremonger)(referring to the UK and the US, who ultimately acceded on 30 
January  1970 and 25 November 1988 respectively). 
57 DFA 417/65 Part II (Butler to Iremonger) (Updating Justice of every new ratification).  
58 DFA 417/65 Part I (Iremonger to Hearne, 15 October 1950).   
59 DFA 417/65 Part II (O’K to Iremonger, 22 February 1951).  
60 DFA 417/65 Part II (Letter to Butler, 10 July 10 1951, signed SGM).  
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law legal heritage singled out Australia, while France and Norway were within Ireland’s 
European network in the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation and the Council 
of Europe.61 Meanwhile, External Affairs were potentially exposed to public criticism 
because there was no obvious move by Ireland to accede. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, 
although there was some activity by domestic interest groups in the early 1950s, there was no 
equivalent to the powerful advocacy in Parliament as witnessed in the British engagement. In 
December 1950, the Irish Association of Civil Liberties (IACL) enquired about Ireland’s 
position and received a low-key response from External Affairs.62 Although “sympathetic to 
the motives which inspired” the Genocide Convention, Ireland could not offer a definite reply 
pending the results of the examination of the political and legal aspects at present in 
progress.63 When subsequently the IACL, in their 1951 report, pointed to Ireland’s failure to 
accede to the Genocide Convention,64 an External Affairs official wrote a somewhat 
emotional memo to the Legal Adviser that they should bring the Director of the IACL into 
the department and give him the low-down on why Ireland could not accede, albeit 
“unofficially”.65 He wrote: 
 
“In view of all the malicious propaganda against this country during and after the last 
war about the harbouring of Nazis and fascists, it would hardly be wise… at this stage, 
to state our objections officially to the Association.” 66  
 
His less melodramatic suggestion was to explain Ireland’s difficulty with the removal of the 
political offences exception because if the IACL was “really interested” in human rights, the 
question of political asylum should be of interest to them.67 In the end, the Legal Adviser 
adopted the final more subdued suggestion—that they ignore NGO interest and continue to 
monitor further developments.68  
That said, the IACL Report had some effect because Butler requested Eoin MacWhite 
to draft a memo on the history, current ratifications and the pros and cons of Irish accession.69 
The result was the first tactical brief to be drafted within External Affairs. On whether the 
Convention is “symbolic” or practical, MacWhite concluded that the Genocide Convention 
was “quite useless and superfluous” because genocide was “only mass homicide” and 
therefore already proscribed in all States.70 His position ignored the moral outrage embedded 
in the concept of genocide as the “denial of the right of existence” to certain groups71 and 
therefore a unique form of destruction against a group rather than a large number of 
individual killings. As Arendt argued, “a different order is broken and an altogether different 
community is violated”.72 However, it is possible that MacWhite held the same reservations 
                                                          
61 DFA 417/65 Part II (Letter to Butler). 
62 DFA 417/65 Part I (Butler to Gore-Grimes, 4 December 1950).  
63 DFA 417/65 Part I (Butler to Gore-Grimes). 
64 DFA 417/65 Part II (Letter to Butler). 
65 DFA 417/65 Part II (Letter to Butler). 
66 DFA 417/65 Part II (Letter to Butler). 
67 DFA 417/65 Part II (Letter to Butler). 
68 DFA 417/65 Part II (Butler to Murphy, 13 July 1951). 
69 DFA 417/65 Part II (Butler to Murphy). 
70 DFA 417/65 Part I (MacWhite’s Memo). Dr Eoin MacWhite became First Secretary to the Department of 
External Affairs in 1951 and later became Irish Ambassador to Australia, credited with “quite remarkable 
contribution to the history of Ireland in Australia” and Irish Ambassador to the Netherlands, where tragically he 
died in a car accident in August 1972. See Letter to the Editors, Irish Times, 7 August 1972 and “MacWhite: A 
Noted Scholar, Linguist”, 1 August 1972.  
71 Preamble of Resolution 260(III). 
72 H. Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin Books, 2006), p.270. 
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as the Foreign Office, that is, the Convention needed to address State responsibility, rather 
than solely individual criminal responsibility.73  
MacWhite argued further that any tribunal in practice would be rendered “impotent” as 
genocide is “only committed by Governments” and therefore, war would be the “only 
possible action” against genocide—“sanctions of an international court would not be very 
effective”.74 While his view on “sanctions” could arguably have been confined to sentencing 
(and its deterrent effect), it could also refer to the effectiveness of a tribunal’s operation and 
here his concerns have subsequently proved to be well-founded and far-sighted.75 As the 
current challenges facing the International Criminal Court demonstrate, international criminal 
trials are located within high stakes political contexts, facing consistent criticisms, and this, in 
turn, has led increasingly to potent critiques of the international criminal law project.76 
Similarly, applications to the International Court of Justice have had considerable emotive 
power but proved little by way of protective force.77 Regarding MacWhite’s view that war 
would be the only true preventative measure,78 this would now be reframed as the use of 
military force authorised by the UN Security Council under the concept of the Responsibility 
to Protect.79 Contemporary practice indicates that his conclusion is less clairvoyant as the 
invocation of responsibility to protect has been controversial.80 Nevertheless, MacWhite was 
overall “sympathetic on principle” because the Convention involved the condemnation of the 
crime of genocide and counted as international action by international accord.81 Even if the 
Genocide Convention “might not go far enough, [it] is at least a step in the right direction”.82 
On the Convention’s legal obligations, MacWhite’s tone is almost mournful. Nothing 
can be done regarding the provisions of the Genocide Convention and its purpose is penal 
rather than preventative and thus “inadequate”.83 He read its “raison d’être” as purely to 
overcome accusations levelled against the Nuremberg Charter that its proscription of crimes 
against humanity under art.6(c) violated the generally recognised principles of legality, an 
argument used by the Nazi defence counsel.84 Nevertheless, while this may be one of the 
motivations, there is clear evidence of humanitarian motives among drafters, not least 
Shawcross’ quiet diplomacy and the Australian Foreign Minister, H.V. Evatt’s steering 
during the final stages of the Convention’s drafting. One key criticism levelled at the 
Convention at the time of its drafting (and still) was the selectivity in the list of protected 
groups.85 MacWhite felt that this selectivity would render the Convention ineffective in the 
                                                          
73 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 25 and 29. See Arendt, Eichmann 
in Jerusalem, 2006, pp.294 and 298 (on paradox of trials over international crimes). 
74 Simpson, “Britain” (2002) 73(1) British Yearbook of International Law 5 at 37. 
75 On the controversy over the arrest of President Al Bashir, see D. Tladi, “The ICC Decisions on Chad and 
Malawi on Co-operation, Immunities and Article 98” (2013) 11(1) Journal of International Criminal Justice 
199. 
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face of “the genocide of political groups in China and the liquidation of various ethnic groups 
in Russia”.86 While he did not disagree with individual criminal responsibility per se, he 
concluded that, without the inclusion of political groups, “[the Convention’s] sole real use is 
as a protest”.87 On the thorny issue of the removing the political offences exception, he 
argued that Ireland could avoid any difficulties by submitting a reservation to art.VII of the 
Genocide Convention.88 However, MacWhite was clearly unaware that the International 
Court of Justice had just advised the UN General Assembly that while reservations were not 
prohibited, the Convention would not be binding as between reserving and objecting States 
where the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention.89 If one 
draws inferences from references to international cooperation in the Preamble and art.I of the 
Genocide Convention, one evident object and purpose is effective State Party cooperation to 
ensure punishment. Therefore, it is arguable that a reservation to genocide’s exemption from 
the political offence exception would be incompatible with the Convention’s object and 
purpose.  
  
(b) Perception of “norm cascade”, symbolism and a defiant strict compliance 
 
Although MacWhite’s brief was tactical, it demonstrates that certain Irish officials viewed the 
Convention as merely symbolic. Given its tone, MacWhite’s brief did not lead to any 
immediate action. However, when the new Legal Adviser to External Affairs William Fay 
took up his post in 1953, he viewed the file very differently. Based on the limited material 
before him, Fay felt that Justice’s opinion was not sound and Irish accession should go 
ahead.90 He tasked his Assistant Legal Adviser to undertake a detailed legal analysis that was 
the first article-by-article analysis within the Legal Section.91 Waldron concurred with Fay’s 
changed stance as he viewed the current number of ratifications as “an imposing list”.92 Even 
so, he noted that neither the United Kingdom nor the United States had become a party.93 In 
other words, norm cascade had not yet happened. On the definition under art.II, Waldron 
believed that acts (b) to (e) involved assaults, if not battery, at common law, although the 
Attorney General’s views should be sought.94 As observed below, ratifying States were also 
uncertain about their domestic law compatibility. Overall, Waldron shared MacWhite’s 
criticism of mere criminalisation; it was “inappropriate, if not inadequate, for their 
prevention”.95 On the modes of liability under art.III, he considered legislation unnecessary 
with the exception of complicity.96 Nevertheless, in the Genocide Act 1973, the Act 
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reproduced the Convention as a Schedule rather than proscribing separately on certain modes 
of liability.97  
On personal liability of Heads of State and other public officials, Waldron viewed this 
as covered by Art.40(1) of the Irish Constitution.98 In Irish law, the issue of procedural 
immunity before foreign courts has not been judicially tested and has hardly been addressed 
in academic literature.99 In the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Irish 
delegation recently explained that there is no specific legislation on State immunity but Irish 
law accords with customary international law.100 However, this sidesteps the considerable 
disagreement among international lawyers on immunities of State officials in international 
criminal law.101 Therefore, Waldron’s conclusion was somewhat unsophisticated. On 
jurisdiction, Waldron’s only observation was that art.VI differed from the Geneva 
Convention, in that it did not require States Parties to criminalise acts of genocide committed 
extraterritorially.102 While certain delegations had advocated for universal jurisdiction, this 
proposal was ultimately rejected during the Convention’s drafting.103 Waldron did not pass 
comment on whether this was acceptable. 
It follows that the most detailed observation addresses the political offences exception 
to extradition. Waldron noted the British objections and that Justice was currently preparing a 
draft Extradition Bill. He advocated for the removal of the political offences exception for 
genocide within the proposed Bill. He justified the removal based on one theory among 
extradition lawyers that the political offences exception would not apply where the core 
crime predominates. Adhering to the strict compliance position, Waldron concluded that 
legislation was required to criminalise acts of genocide and to amend Irish extradition law 
before the Genocide Convention could be fully implemented. Therefore, he felt it might be 
desirable to delay accession until legislative measures had been taken.104 There seems to be 
no response to Waldron’s memorandum, apart from querying with their British counterparts 
whether there had been any further developments towards British accession. The Irish 
ambassador to Britain, Frederick Boland, queried Britain’s general position and in particular 
sought to elicit answers to the following issues—the relationship between a legitimate 
declaration of war and genocide, the criminal proscription for genocide, the political offences 
exception and its attitude to States Parties’ reservations. 105 In reply, British officials 
explained that the position was unchanged since it was outlined in Parliament in 1950. 
Therefore, the British Cabinet had not yet decided on accession. However, they were 
examining the extent of amendments to the existing law to enable Britain to ratify.106 While 
this was factually true, of course, it failed to reveal the fractious interdepartmental dispute 
over strict or mere substantive compliance. 
                                                          
97 Section 2 and Schedule of Genocide Act 1973, Act No.28 of 1973. 
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With this “unhelpful” response,107 there was no further discussion until the following 
year, when Fay decided that External Affairs could elicit from ratifying States, with whom 
Ireland had diplomatic relations, the compatibility of their respective domestic laws with the 
Convention. Even the British could be contacted once more to check their progress, “if 
any”.108 Waldron’s Note Verbal was sent to the missions in Australia, France, Norway, 
Belgium, Sweden, Canada, Italy and Turkey in April 1954.109 At the same time, a separate 
telegram was sent to London.110 The Note Verbal requested information on the Criminal 
Code and the legal means to remove the political offence exception.111 From July onwards, 
the responses started to stream into External Affairs.112 Only the Australian and Canadian 
examples will be tendered, as they both adopted the position of mere substantive compliance 
(despite common law systems) that clearly did not impress Irish officials.  
The Australian officials first pulled out a “ready-made answer”113 that explained how 
existing Australian law provides “substantially” for punishment and how adequate legal 
safeguards were in place to deal with anything arising under the Convention.114 However, 
when Australian officials actually responded, it was somewhat less formal. A junior official 
in the Australian Department of External Affairs explained to the Irish Embassy in Canberra 
that it had been decided not to answer in written form and “that he preferred to give the 
information in confidence on the telephone”.115 He explained that Australia had acceded at 
the instance of the then Minister for External Affairs, Dr Evatt, “without having given itself 
time to examine fully the implications” and, in particular, “before the Attorney-General’s 
Department had an opportunity of examining the Convention in detail”.116 Notwithstanding 
the lack of preparation prior to ratification, it was felt that “nearly” every act within the 
genocide definition would be a criminal offence under existing Australian law.117 Australian 
departments decided not to draft specific legislation because, under the Federal system, it 
would be too difficult to “cover with precision and certainty the acts which constitute the 
crime of genocide”.118 It would also not be possible to list all the relevant provisions in 
Australian law as there were too many under State and Federal law to list. On the removal of 
the political offences exception, no method for resolving the obligation with Australian 
extradition law had been found.119  
 The Canadian response was in writing and lengthy. It divulged in detail the relevant 
sections of the Criminal Code but it is notably less certain whether criminal proceedings 
could actually be taken further down the list of acts under art.II.120 On killing and causing 
serious bodily harm, the Canadian officials were confident of domestic compliance.121 They 
were less confident regarding the act of causing serious… mental harm; if not covered under 
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assault, homicide, letters threatening to kill, letters threatening property or kidnapping, 
unlawful imprisonment and similar matters, it would “probably” be included within the crime 
of conspiring to commit an indictable offence.122 On “deliberately inflicting… conditions of 
life…”, this would “necessarily involve some form of assault”.123 On “forcibly transferring of 
children…”, this would “appear to fall” under kidnapping, abduction or false 
imprisonment.124 Notwithstanding, the Canadian Government was overall confident of its 
domestic law compatibility.125 On the political offences exception, Canadian officials did not 
consider acts of genocide as political offences and, as a result, the exception did not arise.126 
In Dublin, this caused pause for thought as in the margin a large question mark was placed.127  
 Importantly, the British position came in which confirmed that little progress had 
been made apart from a decision at Cabinet that legislation would be required. 128 The attitude 
was that the genocide definition was “so loosely worded” as to raise doubts about how to 
produce a draft Bill that would be suitable for presentation to Parliament.129 Another problem 
for the British was the removal of the political offences exception, which might oblige Britain 
to surrender a refugee on a charge of genocide whose “real crime was political e.g. the leader 
of the defeated party in a civil war”. This would remove its right to grant asylum to “bona 
fide political refugees”.130 This was, however, public rhetoric, as in early 1953 the Home 
Office had produced three alternative bills and, by late 1953, had reduced this to one final 
draft. In the end, all these answers were correlated for Justice.131 Although there is no evident 
response from Justice among the papers, Justice’s position against accession was probably 
maintained. However, the Legal Section of External Affairs began to slowly change its 
position and adopted a more positive attitude towards accession if, in the event, strict 
compliance was guaranteed. Here, the unresolved difficulties for other common law States 
would not have been very reassuring. Nevertheless, given its more positive stance, External 
Affairs adapted its policy to the undesirability of belonging within a small minority of non-
ratifying States (rather than one of complete isolation).132 Therefore, External Affairs 
continued to monitor ratifications. By the end of 1954 there were 48,133 and this left a 
sufficient number of non-ratifying States to continue to delay accession.134  
 
(c) A defiant Strict Compliance position… and yet failing to legislate 
 
That said, success on Ireland’s application for UN membership in 1955 meant that there was 
some brief interest in Ireland’s position in early 1956. The Legal Adviser Sean Morrissey 
asked his officials to “not lose sight of our position” and at the earliest possibility to 
reconsider Justice’s reasons for not acceding.135 As part of this reconsideration, he queried 
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whether the UK and US had acceded. However, in the end, this brief interest made little 
difference apart from updating the list of ratifications.136 Thereafter, the file appears to have 
been untouched by either the Political or Legal Section until March 1959137 and, even then, it 
was simply to update the list and pass it on to Justice.138 Nothing more could be done without 
a new Extradition Act.139 Yet uncertainty over Irish extradition law became an increasingly 
critical issue and provided External Affairs’ with leverage over other departments. In 
September 1959, there was a meeting between the Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, 
the Legal Adviser to External Affairs, Sean Morrissey, and the Attorney General.140 This 
brought to the fore the departmental turf war between External Affairs and Justice over 
extradition law reform. The Attorney General believed that the Fugitive Offenders Act 1881 
probably applied in Irish law as he did not consider that the 1937 Constitution would 
fundamentally alter the reasoning of a 1931 Irish Free State judgment.141 As there had been 
no further extradition treaties since 1922, extradition arrangements would have to depend on 
the Government’s attitude towards pre-1922 British concluded treaties.142 The Legal Adviser 
complained about how the lack of extradition law reform had prevented Ireland from 
ratifying humanitarian Conventions, such as the four Geneva Conventions and the Genocide 
Convention. Despite urging Justice to complete an Extradition Act, nothing had been 
forthcoming. In support, the Minister for External Affairs interjected that the Fugitive 
Offenders Act would only resolve extradition arrangements vis-à-vis Commonwealth States 
but did not resolve the global question. The Attorney General understood the Irish 
Government’s objection to the Genocide Convention to be its potential effect on its 
relationship with Britain, one that would oblige the Irish Government “to return fugitive 
offenders from the six counties” (Northern Ireland). But, he added, the political exception 
continued to apply and it was for Irish courts to determine if the acts of violence were 
political offences.143 This is the first reference to a Northern Ireland dimension. 
It follows, then, that the Government had decided in the early 1950s to examine the 
criminal and extradition codes with a view to reform. Nevertheless, since then, no progress 
had been made by Justice. The Legal Section of External Affairs considered itself 
understaffed and, this being so, the Attorney General agreed to arrange a meeting between his 
Office, Justice and External Affairs to see what progress could be made on the introduction of 
legislation.144 Although there is no record of the interdepartmental meeting, a June 1960 letter 
to the Secretary General in Justice cites countless letters from the Legal Section concerning 
the need for extradition legislation and emphasising the urgency of the problem.145 It stressed 
how Justice was aware that many States enquired regarding Ireland’s position on extradition 
and that Ireland was now one of the few remaining States that had failed to ratify the Geneva 
Conventions (1949) despite the Taoiseach expressing the desire for Ireland to become a State 
Party.146 It also stressed that the Attorney General regarded the matter as one of urgency and 
that the desired ratification of humanitarian Conventions necessitated urgent action.147 
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Interestingly, even though the Genocide Convention was one of the prompts for law reform, 
the Extradition Act (1965)148 did not remove the political offences exception for the crime of 
genocide.149  
 
III. WHY IRELAND DECIDED TO ACCEDE? THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1968 AND THE AFTERMATH 
 
The UN General Assembly designated 1968 as the International Year of Human Rights,150 
recommending that Member States should ratify all human rights Conventions before 
1968.151 In 1966, some officials argued that it would permit Ireland to “improve on our 
record in human rights”.152 On the Genocide Convention, the Assistant Legal Adviser Mahon 
Hayes pointed out that the key legal and policy obstacles remained.153 The Extradition Act 
1965 maintained the political offences exception for ordinary criminal offences154 and the 
political view was to wait until Ireland was one of a small minority of non-ratifying States.155 
Without political leadership, nothing would be done except to continue tracking the number 
of ratifications.  
This cut developments short until July 1967 when, it seems, enquiries were made to 
the Irish Permanent Mission to the UN on whether Ireland would accede.156 In reply, the 
Legal Section’s conclusions from the year before remained unchanged and, coupled with the 
“attitude” of Justice, accession was “extremely unlikely” until Ireland was within a small 
minority of non-ratifying states. 157 This led to further queries from the Irish Permanent 
Representative to the UN, Con Cremin.158 Was the sole problem extradition? And did the 
External Affairs’ minute imply that Justice “declined to insert an appropriate provision to 
cover the point [in the Extradition Bill]”? 159 It seems that Cremin was correct, because the 
Legal Adviser replied that the Secretary General in External Affairs had sent the Legal 
Section’s comments on the Genocide Convention to Justice in 1962, as the latter examined its 
Extradition Bill.160 But the Minister for External Affairs Frank Aiken had included a caveat. 
He was not suggesting that appropriate legislation regarding genocide was required at this 
time.161 In other words, it was at Justice’s discretion whether or not to contend with the issue. 
Clearly, on extradition law reform the real focus for External Affairs was on extradition 
arrangements in global terms and the ratification of the 1949 Geneva Conventions.  
That said, Cremin also added some wry observations on the current list of 
ratifications. Although the current list (71 States), may appear to be still limited, he observed 
how this stemmed from inaction by States, predominately African, who had recently acquired 
their independence.162 He noted that, aside from the inaction of African States, there was only 
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a limited number of UN members that had not yet acceded. Ten were former British 
possessions, another a former Dutch possession (Indonesia), all of whom had recently gained 
independence, and then the following 10 countries: Britain, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Nepal, Portugal, South Africa, Spain, Thailand and Yemen.163 This showed how the gap 
comprising a “small minority of states” was actually narrowing a lot faster than External 
Affairs had fully appreciated. Cremin then quoted from an “interesting article” on the failure 
of successive US Presidents to secure the agreement of Congress and the Senate to accede to 
the Genocide Convention.164 This failure to accede had caused serious embarrassment to the 
United States in the United Nations.165 Every time the United States endorsed a particular 
question of human rights protection, the Soviet Union forcefully challenged the former’s 
commitment166 because the United States had failed to accede to any human rights treaty.167 
United States’ pronouncements were often “branded as brazen hypocrisy” and its actual 
values inferred from the “kind of company we keep”, that is, other non-ratifying States, such 
as Apartheid South Africa and Franco’s Spain.168 This was an obvious comparator as 
Ireland’s human rights treaty record was nearly identical to that of the United States.169 It 
followed that the Soviet challenge could equally cause difficulty for the Irish Permanent 
Mission in its pronouncements.  
 With the dawn of the International Year of Human Rights and Cremin’s astute 
observations, External Affairs was anxious that an active civil society could potentially cause 
public embarrassment. This injected some life back into the idea of accession. In early 
January, the Minister for External Affairs had obviously been quizzed about accession to the 
Convention. Thus, Waldron advised the Secretary General that as Justice was urgently 
considering amendments to the Extradition Act, External Affairs should propose that they 
include consideration of the removal of the political offence exception for genocide.170 This 
would permit the Minister to claim, somewhat justifiably, that the matter was under “active 
consideration”.171 On 24 January 1968, External Affairs announced its measures to mark the 
International Year of Human Rights. These included giving “consideration” to legal and other 
steps required to enable Ireland to ratify as many human rights treaties as possible, to which 
Ireland was not already a party.172 To an astute observer, this was all but the European 
Convention on Human Rights (and a Council of Europe treaty). This desire to present a more 
positive human rights treaty record may have been inspired to some extent by contemporary 
events in Northern Ireland, where the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and other 
civil rights groups had begun a series of civil rights marches in the summer of 1968.173  
 Significantly, there was a shift in terms of political leadership in Justice in early 
August and the Legal Section of External Affairs was told that Justice was prepared to 
sponsor legislation to enable accession.174 Unsurprisingly, a markedly different attitude was 
taken in the Justice’s Memorandum for Government and this was transferred to External 
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Affairs in November and travelled through the Legal and Political Sections.175 This 
memorandum was conciliatory and portrayed a sense of urgency to accede. It emphasised 
Ireland’s isolation as a non-party State; “many States, including most of the States of Western 
Europe”, excluding Ireland and the United Kingdom.176 Ireland, it suggested, must move 
swiftly as the Minister for External Affairs wants Ireland to accede during the International 
Year of Human Rights and the British Cabinet have now produced a bill.177 However, Justice 
sought to allay any fears of Cabinet Ministers given the “imprecise” genocide definition and 
the probable dispute over its correct interpretation. Such difficulties were of little import as 
Ireland would never be “embarrassed” by the Convention.178 The Genocide Bill would 
simply criminalise acts of genocide under art.II which would carry a maximum sentence of 
life-imprisonment for murder and 14 years for all other offences. It would remove the 
political offences exception and require the Attorney General’s consent for any proceedings 
undertaken.179 It is interesting that no comment was made on the precondition of the AG’s 
consent, given the general recognition that “acts of genocide would almost invariably occur 
with connivance of the government”.180 Finally, criminalising the modes of liability181 would 
be undertaken only if deemed necessary.182 Therefore, Waldron’s uncertainty was not shared 
as sharply by Justice. There were no observations from External Affairs as the proposed Bill 
would implement most of the provisions of the Genocide Convention into law when 
enacted.183 On 26 November, the Cabinet approved the Minister for Justice’s general scheme 
and authorised drafting.184 
 
(a) Why a continuing delay? Interdepartmental “turf wars” and inertia  
 
After the Irish Cabinet decision, the Attorney General was asked to arrange for the drafting of 
the Genocide Bill and a photostat of the recently enacted British Bill was included for 
inspiration.185 Nevertheless, the sense of urgency had subsided considerably, owing in some 
part to its being close to the end of the International Year of Human Rights. It was no longer 
“practicable” to enact the Genocide Bill by the end of the year.186 But Justice had since 
discovered that External Affairs would be satisfied by conveying to the United Nations how 
Ireland was preparing the necessary legislation.187 Notwithstanding, the Parliamentary 
Draftsman undertook the work within a month and sent the draft Bill to the Attorney 
General,188 who forwarded it immediately to Justice.189 Following this, there is no further 
development until November 1969. This can probably be explained by the deepening crisis in 
Northern Ireland and the intense schism within the Irish Cabinet over whether to pursue 
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political avenues only or to include a military response.190 This schism became more acute 
after the violence of the “Battle of the Bogside” in August 1969 and the deployment of the 
British Army to support the Stormont administration.191 As part of maintaining a “peaceful 
approach”, the Irish Defence Forces were ordered to establish field hospitals along the border 
and the Taoiseach made a televised address calling for a UN peacekeeping force. In fact, the 
Minister for Foreign Affairs was dispatched to try (unsuccessfully) to secure an item on the 
UN Security Council and General Assembly agendas.192  
That said, Cabinet approval of a Genocide Bill was a convenient truth on which to 
pivot the credibility of the celebration of the International Year of Human Rights. 
Consequently, the Minister for External Affairs trumpeted the Cabinet’s approval for 
accession in his foreign policy speech to Parliament.193 Notwithstanding, the Irish Permanent 
Mission to the United Nations and certain embassies still kept a watchful eye on the number 
of ratifications to keep up the pressure. De Paor, in the Irish Permanent Mission, noted that 
Britain became the 75th State Party on 30 January 1970,194 while Swift, in the Irish Embassy 
in Canada, described the passage of the Canadian hate propaganda and genocide legislation in 
the Canadian House of Commons.195 All this information was forwarded to Justice yet no 
response from Justice was forthcoming from April to the end of August 1970. At this point, 
the Assistant Legal Adviser, Mahon Hayes, discussed the matter with Mr Olden from Justice, 
who could not understand or explain the delay. When further enquiries were made on Mahon 
Hayes’ behalf, no response was forthcoming. This led Mahon Hayes to request External 
Affairs’ staff to send a series of pointed reminders to Justice between October 1970 and 
January 1971.196 Justice’s silence may have had to do with more pressing matters at the end 
of 1970, that is, its entanglement in the infamous Arms Trial, where the Minister for Justice 
and other Cabinet Ministers were on trial for allegedly having organised a plot to smuggle 
arms for the Provisional IRA campaign.197  
Pressure began to intensify from early 1971 as status-oriented concerns became a 
critical issue. The Irish Permanent Mission reported that the United States might become a 
State Party because the Sub-Committee of the Senate’s Foreign Relations Committee was 
considering placing the Convention before the plenary Senate.198 This made it appear that 
Ireland was losing all her influential friends among the non-ratifying States. Nevertheless, a 
whole year passed, with newly-named Foreign Affairs199 reminding Justice in November 
1971200 and January 1972.201 There is clear frustration at Justice’s inertness in Foreign 
Affairs’ correspondence in January and February 1972, particularly as Foreign Affairs started 
to look at their future EEC partners and wished to concur with their position. At that time, the 
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Political and Legal Sections were involved in the enormous undertaking of negotiating 
Ireland’s accession to the EEC, which led to the signature of the accession treaty in January 
1972.202 James Sharkey explained to the Assistant Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the 
general feeling of the Political Section was “that Ireland should not lag behind her future 
European Economic Community partners on matters of this kind”.203 If the EEC Member 
States had shown “little interest” in ratifying the Genocide Convention, Sharkey considered 
this to be a different matter entirely.204  
 Research indicated that, within the 75 States Parties, all Western European States had 
acceded, except Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Malta and New Zealand. 205 Within the 10 
EEC Member States, Ireland and Luxembourg were the only non-ratifying States.206 Keating 
advocated that Justice should be again alerted to the Foreign Affairs position, that it would be 
undesirable for Ireland to be among a small minority of non-ratifying States.207 Thus, 
geographical proximity was critical for the Political Section at this point and, given Ireland’s 
EEC partners’ near universal acceptance of the norm, Ireland should follow suit. Another 
dimension was “the situation in Northern Ireland”,208 which implies that the Political Section 
(clearly without legal analysis) considered the possibility of invoking the Genocide 
Convention against the United Kingdom over killings of members of the nationalist 
(Catholic) community by British security forces in Northern Ireland. The involvement of the 
Political Section meant significantly that there were more voices pushing for accession than 
the Legal Section and the Irish Permanent Mission to United Nations.209 Notwithstanding, 
from February 1972 to 1973, there was no Foreign Affairs reprimand of Justice’s slowness. 
But Foreign Affairs had three major political issues to contend with at the time—its response 
to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the fractious Anglo-Irish relationship and Ireland’s 
membership of the EEC. 
 
(b) Critical influence of UN Human Rights Programmes 
 
Political leadership and interest groups played a greater role from the end of 1972 onwards. 
In Parliament, Dr O’Connell asked whether the Government intended to ratify the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights210 and this reopened an old wound about 
Ireland’s human rights image. In response, Foreign Affairs turned back to a convenient pre-
prepared option, the Genocide Bill. They were told that the Minister for Justice hoped to 
introduce the Bill before the Summer Recess.211 With an election and Government change in 
March 1973, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs Garret Fitzgerald was even more eager to 
make progress. An opportune prompt was provided by the 25th anniversary of the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights in 1973, a new UN mark of encouragement.212 Garret 
Fitzgerald wanted a “strong effort” to ratify as many Human Rights Conventions as 
possible.213 He told Justice that the Government (in particular Foreign Affairs) had been 
“under considerable pressure” from NGOs and private organisations and, as a result, the 
Minister was “particularly anxious” that the Government pursue this policy.214 Although the 
final draft of Fitzgerald’s letter is missing, it seems probable that he advocated urgent action 
by Justice. However, Justice’s reply raised further confusion over doctrinal law and this 
delayed matters further. Justice asked about military court jurisdiction and the Legal Section 
in Foreign Affairs had to research the issue.215 The International Organisations Section 
stressed the desirability of disposing the matter “speedily, in order not to give… Justice an 
excuse for further delay”.216 Research by the Assistant Legal Adviser Charles Lysaght took 
two months because the relevant files were “rescued from the Registry only after a month’s 
search”.217 His research revealed that the Geneva Conventions Bill was submitted to Cabinet 
without any observations from the Department of Defence and with no reference to courts 
martial among Justice’s observations.218 Rather the Bill had been “prepared in great haste” at 
the behest of the Taoiseach and it was “not inconceivable” that the issue was overlooked.219 
Foreign Affairs passed on Lysaght’s research to Justice, agreeing that clarification was 
desirable. Justice must have clarified this internally as the Genocide Bill extended the 
jurisdiction of military courts to genocide.220 
In the end, the frame of the 1973 Bill was very similar to the 1969 Memo for 
Government and, in turn, this accorded in general with Waldron’s suggestions in 1953. This 
being so, the 1973 Bill criminalised the acts under art.II of the Convention,221 with the same 
sentencing maximums as the 1969 Memo.222 Criminal jurisdiction was extended to the 
Central Criminal Court223 and criminal proceedings could be instituted only by or with the 
consent of the Attorney General.224 Genocide was also deemed an offence against military 
law by amending the Defence Act (1954)225 and military jurisdiction was extended to 
genocide.226 Lastly, the main stumbling block, genocide and associated ancillary offences 
would not be considered as political offences for the purposes of the Extradition Act 1965.227 
In a related vein, the rule of double criminality in extradition law was also excluded.228 With 
the Genocide Bill completed, Justice submitted its Memorandum for Government in 
September.229 The memo stressed Ireland’s isolated position; Great Britain and most Western 
European States were already States Parties.230 It also stressed that the Minister for Foreign 
Affairs was eager to accede during the 25th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
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Human Rights.231 At the Cabinet meeting on 11 October, the Government approved the 
Genocide Bill and authorised the Minister for Justice to introduce the Bill to the Dáil.232 The 
Bill was passed through both Houses of the Oireachtas without objection despite introducing 
a number of critical changes in Irish law.233 The Genocide Act was then signed into law on 19 
December 1973, just in time to fulfil the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ policy and improve the 
Government’s image on human rights treaty acceptance.234 One immediate benefit of the 
Genocide Act was that Foreign Affairs could reply more meaningfully to a recent 
questionnaire for the UN Study on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Ireland had 
enacted the Genocide Act 1973, would accede shortly and there had been no prosecutions yet 
under the Act.235  
 
(c) More interdepartmental “turf wars” and inertia 
The next move was to secure Cabinet approval for the instrument of ratification. Preparation 
included an update of the number of States Parties, with heavy emphasis being placed on the 
numbers of Western European States.236 It also involved coaxing other departments to 
respond to the draft Memorandum of Foreign Affairs. This time, it was the Attorney 
General’s Office that stalled matters. Requests for its observations were sent by Foreign 
Affairs on 3 May,237 11 June,238 17 July,239 21 August240 and 21 October 1974.241 On 29 
September 1975, Foreign Affairs wrote a curt note to the Attorney General’s Office to deal 
with the matter “on a priority basis”.242 Assistant Legal Adviser Declan Quigley replied with 
a short handwritten note explaining that the delay was due to s.3(1) of the Genocide Act (the 
removal of the political offence exception) without any further elaboration.243 It is unclear 
what the problem was exactly, especially when on review on the same day both Declan 
Quigley and the Attorney General Declan Costello concluded that the Genocide Act 1973 
permitted accession.244 Unfortunately, the Attorney General’s advice has not been kept. 245 
With the Attorney General’s support and no objection from Justice or Finance, Foreign 
Affairs could finalise its memorandum, which was submitted to Cabinet on 23 December.246  
 The final memorandum explained how the delay in accession was due to difficulties 
involving the giving of legislative effect to the definition of genocide, drafted in “very wide 
terms” and the caution over removing the political offence exception.247 It then highlighted 
how the previous Government approved the drafting of necessary legislation in November 
1968, “mindful of the impression of lack of respect for the objects of the Convention to 
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which our continued non-accession could give rise”.248 A draft Memorandum of May 1974 
spoke more plainly. There was hesitancy in the light of Ireland’s refusal to surrender war 
criminals after World War II and an objection to countenancing the extradition of political 
offenders.249 A handwritten version of this draft Memorandum referred to a “radical 
departure” from Ireland’s previous policy.250 As noted earlier by this writer, the “vagueness” 
of the genocide definition was never the critical stumbling block. Rather, once the “radical 
departure” from previous policy was chosen, the previous Government (in particular Justice) 
assumed that the Convention would never be actually invoked in Ireland in any case. On 9 
January 1976, the Cabinet agreed to permit the Minister for Foreign Affairs to accede251 and 
on 2 February 1976 Ireland deposited her instrument of ratification, without reservations, to 
the United Nations Secretary General Kurt Waldheim.252 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ireland’s delayed accession demonstrates the untidiness of state practice—a “messy” jumble 
of persuasion, status-oriented concerns, material interest, bureaucracy, political leadership 
and doctrinal law.253 The writer observed that Irish government departments maintained a 
unified position that strict compliance with domestic law was necessary and, in general, that 
they were agreed on doctrinal law concerns. The major stumbling block was the uncertainty 
over compatibility with domestic extradition arrangements. This was particularly challenging 
as Irish officials were uncertain whether the 1870 British Extradition Act had survived the 
1937 Constitution. Quietly, officials read the removal of the political offences exception as a 
“radical departure” from Ireland’s post-World War II policy. Given the legal (and political) 
difficulties, there was little political leadership on this major stumbling block until 1968, 
when External Affairs sought to exhibit a positive human rights treaty image. In fact, 
External Affairs had earlier only causally mentioned the issue to Justice when Justice was 
completing its Extradition Bill and ultimately it was unaddressed by the Extradition Act 
1965. It has also been noted that most Irish officials were agreed that the Convention was 
politically useless and thereby agreed more fundamentally about “what the function of the 
Convention really was”, that is, as “symbolic” rather than “practical, to deter future acts of 
genocide”.254 It is also evident that External (later Foreign) Affairs was acutely influenced by 
status-oriented concerns. Its officials periodically updated the account of ratifications and 
later changed the original interdepartmental policy of complete isolation into an External 
Affairs policy of a “small minority of non-ratifying states”. In the end, they successfully 
persuaded Justice and the Attorney General’s Office to follow their preferred policy, arguing 
that Ireland’s standing within regional and global communities was critical and dependent on 
a more positive human rights treaty image. It was further noted by the writer that while 
domestic interests groups played a very limited role until the 1970s, political pressure exerted 
by them was useful for coaxing other departments and, ultimately, the Cabinet to follow 
Foreign Affairs’ policy. Finally, despite political leadership from Foreign Affairs (and 
Governmental change), Justice and later the Attorney General’s Office engaged in “familiar 
paper shuffling tactics”255 that delayed the completion of the Genocide Bill and, in turn, the 
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instrument of ratification. 
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